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Historically,  agricultural  producers  have been  year-round  if  production  facilities  span  comple-
constrained  by  the  seasonal  nature  of their goods.  mentary  geographic  climates.  Firm-level  implica-
The  geographic  diversification  strategy  offers  al-  tions  from  increased  production  capabilities  are
ternative production plans to the firm by allowing it  two-fold:  Geographic  diversification could  poten-
to  shift production  capabilities  across  complemen-  tially  increase  supply  levels  such  that  prices fall,
tary geographic  climates.  We examine international  or increased market sales could translate to greater
geographic  diversification  strategy,  in combination  total  revenue.  The  net  effect  on profit  would  de-
with free-trade  policy,  as  it applies to the Califor-  pend  on the sensitivity of market price to supplies
nia-Chile  table  grape  market.  Profit potential  is  a  from other areas, measured  by the level of market
function of how distinct the markets  are. Tests  for  integration,  and  the  extent  of the  overlapping  of
market integration are applied to primary U.S. ports  the production seasons in the geographic areas.
of entry for Chilean grapes. The probability that the  U.S.  agribusinesses'  opportunity  to  extend
California-Chile  (Los  Angeles,  California)  and  the North American  growing  and shipping season
California-Chile  (Philadelphia,  Pennsylvania) mar-  through international  geographic  diversification  is
kets  are  integrated  is 9 percent  and  19  percent, re-  examined  in this paper. Analysis  is applied  to the
spectively,  during  the  month  of December,  when  California-Chile  table grape  industry.  Geographic
there is overlapping  supply.  A strategy  of diversi-  diversification  looks  at  the  viability  of  U.S.  pro-
fying  into  the  Southern  Hemisphere  may  work  ducers  extending their growing  and  shipping  sea-
against  the  firm  if market  supply  levels  increase  sons  by  shifting production  capabilities  to  Chile.
enough to lower prices. Partial equilibrium analysis  Assuming that  all other market  conditions  remain
suggests  that  free  trade  will  increase  world  trade  constant,  an  individual  firm  could  potentially
levels,  Chilean  domestic  prices,  and  U.S. demand  capture market premiums across global markets.
for  table  grapes  but  reduce  U.S.  domestic  prices.  The  California  table  grape  industry  is  pro-
Under conditions of incomplete  market integration,  filed  in  the  first section  of this paper.  The  table
price effects  are  less pronounced.  For a  hypotheti-  grape trade between the United States and Chile is
cal U.S. producer, simulation modeling reveals that  characterized  in the  second section.  In  this analy-
the  geographic  diversification  strategy  could be  a  sis, trade is assumed to be one-sided since Chilean
profitable  alternative  to  producing  solely  in  the  markets  have  not  historically  been  open  to  U.S.
United States.  producers.  Degrees  of  market  integration,  as  a
factor for consideration  in geographic  diversifica-
Introduction  tion  strategy,  are  examined  in  the  third  section.
Market integration  test results,  applied  separately
Agribusinesses  face  a unique  opportunity  in  to the  California-Chile  (Los  Angeles,  California)
geographic  diversification  strategy because  of the  and California-Chile  (Philadelphia,  Pennsylvania)
inherent  seasonality  of agricultural  commodities.  table  gape  markets,  are  revealed  in  the  fourth
The issue  of geographic  diversification  examines  section. The effect of the implementation of a free
the economic feasibility  of expanding  production  trade  agreement  in the Western  Hemisphere  on  a
across  several  regions  in  pursuit  of  increased  firm's  decision  to  geographically  diversify  in
profits. Firms that follow this strategy  would shift  South  America  is  evaluated  in  the  fifth  section.
production  across  locations  throughout  the  year.  Finally,  firm profitability is  simulated for a hypo-
As a result, agribusinesses  stand to supply markets  thetical U.S. producer diversifying in Chile.
Within the United States, geographic  diversi-
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A&M  University,  Lorraine  Eden  is associate  professor,  De-  Cook,  1997).  Geographic  diversification  lead-
partment  of Management,  Texas A&M  University;  and Alan  ing to longer growing  seasons for grower-shippers
Gray is assistant professor,  Department  of Agricultural  Eco-  of fresh  tomatoes  in Florida,  Northwest  Mexico,
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and California.  The  desirability of geographic  di-  to  U.S. producers,  and  an  increase  in the overall
versification  is  reflected  in  the  number  of  firms  crop  value  of 82 percent  ($937 million)  from the
adopting  the  strategy.  The  question  remains  1984 values ($515 million).
whether  expansion  of production  facilities  to  the  Crop estimates  for  1997 peaked  at 72 million
Southern  Hemisphere  will  be  profitable  for  pro-  21-pound  boxes,  surpassing  both  1996  and  1995
ducers  of  perishable  agricultural  commodities.  yields (63.9 million and 74.2 million, respectively).
One  result  is  an  increase  in  competition  for  ex-  Recent  demand trends  have,  on average,  increased
pected higher, early season prices. Formerly,  mar-  faster than production  volumes.  Years  1990,  1993,
ket premiums went to the southernmost  producers  and  1995  are  examples  of increased  volume  (over
whose growing  season  preempted that  of produc-  preceding years)  accompanied  by increased  prices.
ers  farther  north.  The  higher  price,  however,  is  In  1997, increases  in volume  supplied were accom-
contingent  upon  all  other  market  factors  being  panied  by  an  increase  in  quantity  demanded  and
held constant.  lower free-on-board  (FOB) prices.
The  1997 box price  averaged  $12.33  per 21-
Objectives  pound box (FOB).  In comparison to the  1996 rec-
ord high average  of $14.13 per box, the 1997  per-
(1)  Evaluate  market integration as  a factor influ-  box  average  was  down  12.5  percent with  respect
encing  a  firm's  decision  to  geographically  to  1995  ($11.93  per box); the  1997  average  price
diversify.  increased  by almost 4 percent.  Monthly prices for
the  Thompson  seedless  variety  are  presented  in
(2)  Examine how implementation of a free  trade Eae inlen  m  ion  Figure  1, using data provided  by the U.S. Depart- area  influences  a  firm's  decision  to  geo-  ment of Agriculture  (USDA).
graphically  diversify.ment  of Agriculture (USDA). graphically  diversify. U.S.  consumption  of  table  grapes  totaled
(3)  Quantify potential total annual revenue effects  899,476  metric  tons  for  1997.  Supplies  originated (3)  Quantify  potential total annual revenue effects  fo  C  o  (  p  C  (29.  per
to  a hypothetical  U.S. producer implementing  from  California  (61.2  percent),  Chile  (29.6  per-
a geographic diversification strategy.  cent),  Mexico (8.2 percent),  and Arizona  (1.0  per-
cent), based on 1996 statistics (Figure 2). At almost
California Industry Profile'  900,000 metric tons, domestic  demand  surpassed a
former record high of 858,000 metric tons in  1995,
California  table  grape  production  emanates  wherein  California  alone  supplied  514,800  metric
from  three distinct  subregions:  Coachella  Valley,  tons. Per capita consumption reached 4.5 pounds in
Imperial  Valley,  and  San  Joaquin  Valley.  The  1997.  This  increase  over  1996  levels,  of  3.8
relative  diversity  of geographic  production  areas  pounds,  can  be  attributed  to  an  increase  in  both
allows  for  prolonged  (sequenced)  growing  sea-  domestic harvests and import volumes.
sons  and  market  access,  both  domestically  and
internationally.  Primary  months  of production  in  Trade in Table Grapes
California  are  May  through  February,  depending
on  variety  and  weather  conditions.  More  than  International  suppliers to the U.S. table grape
744,000 acres  in California are dedicated to grape  market  include Chile  and  Mexico.  While  Chilean
(raisin,  wine,  and table)  production.  Table grapes  volume  supplied to  U.S.  markets  far exceeds  that
account  for  15 percent,  or  111,600  acres,  of said  of Mexico, both countries have strong positions in
total.  the  U.S.  market  at  specific  times throughout  the
The  California Table Grape  Commission  re-  year.  Imports  from Mexico  tend to be  isolated  in
leases  annual  situation  analyses  regarding  sea-  May  whereas  imports  from  Chile  span  several
sonal  flow  patterns,  crop  values,  box  prices,  de-  months during North America's off-season.
mand  trends,  consumption  patterns,  and  im-  At  first  glance  U.S.  and  Chilean  grape-
port/export  shipments.  The  Commission's  1997  growing  seasons look to be  perfect complements.
analysis  notes unprecedented  high  harvest  levels,  California's  season extends  from May to  Novem-
recent  openings  of Chilean  and  Chinese  markets  ber  while  Chilean  production  runs  from  Novem-
ber  until  May.  On  the  whole,  Californian  and
'Information for this section was provided by the Cali-  Chilean  table  gape  seasons  are  characterized  as
fornia Table Grape Commission.114  March 1999  Journal  of Food  Distribution  Research
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Figure 2. Supply Sources, U.S.  Table Grape Market, 1997.
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complementary,  grounded in reverse hemispheric  In periods  of short  supply,  opportunities  for
climatic  conditions.  The  degree  to  which  firms  premiums  exist.  Specifically,  these  premiums
producing  in  the  Northern  and  Southern  Hemi-  could come at the start or close of the U.S. harvest
spheres  compete  is  a  function  of the  amount  of  season.  Seasonal  market  premiums  reflect  con-
overlap at  the start and  close  of harvest  seasons.  sumers'  willingness  to  pay  higher  prices  in  the
Chilean  imports  compete  for  U.S.  market  share  pre-harvest  weeks. Increased market power allows
at  the  open  and close  of each  U.S.  harvest  sea-  producers  who  can supply  the market at  this  time
son.  to ask, and receive, higher prices.
During  the  respective  growing  seasons  of  During  May,  there  are  very  few  shipments
each  country,  the  competitor  produces  little,  if  from  Chile to the United  States.  Competition  for
at  all.  Months  of  overlapping  supply,  namely  U.S. markets  shifts from Chile to Mexico. In part,
May  and  December,  raise  a  question  as  to  this  can be  expected,  given the geographic  prox-
whether  prices  are  influenced  by  competition.  imity  and  closely aligned  growing  seasons.  Mex-
We  expect  prices  to  converge  where  supply  ico's  ability to supply U.S. markets  slightly ahead
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more  southerly  geographic  locale.  To  the  extent  Mexico  and  Chile  both  compete  for  U.S.
that physical proximity to U.S. markets  is a factor  market  share.  Two  factors  that  suggest  that  the
of market  integration,  there  is  some  expectation  U.S.-Mexican  market  will be integrated are Mex-
that the U.S.-Mexican  market will be integrated.  ico's  membership  in  the  North American  Free
Price  differences  between  domestic  and  Trade  Agreement  and  Mexico's  geographic
Mexican supplies  are small  (Table  1),  and  on  six  proximity  to  U.S.  markets.  We  do  not  have
of the  86  observations,  the  calculated  difference  clear  evidence  of  market  integration  between
is 0.  This tendency  toward  very  small  price  dif-  the  United  States  and  Chile  and,  therefore,
ferences  suggests  that price convergence  is  a re-  need  to test the  data  with  a more  rigorous  ap-
sult of market  integration.  Californian  and Mexi-  plication.
can  terminal  wholesale  prices  in  May  1997  are
shown in Figure 3.  Geographic Diversification
Table 1. Price Statistics for California-Mexico  Geographic  diversification  strategy  pres-
Market, May 1993-97.  _  ents  the firm  with  an  alternative  profit  strategy
Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  and  corresponding  risk.  The  primary  benefit
-US$/lb.-  -US$/lb.-  -US$/lb.-  of  geographical  diversification  would  be  in-
California  1.29472  0.32249  0.76596  2.20000  creased  sales  vomes through  year-round  pro-
duction  capabilities.  The  corresponding  risk  is
Mexico  1.27654  0.37646  0.73469  2.63473  that a large number of California firms diversify
Price  and  oversupply  the  early  season  market  such
Difference  0.14010  0.13478  0.01318  0.60392  that the market price is bid down.
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Producers'  objective to increase  sales volume  Within the United  States, industry-wide  geo-
is couched  in  the  expectation  of increased  profit,  graphic diversification  has already  occurred in the
holding all  other factors  constant.  Target markets  fresh  tomato  industry.  Thompson  and  Wilson
for U.S.  producers  of grapes  in  Chile include  off-  (1997)  examine  firm-level  organizational  strate-
season  U.S.  markets  and  all international  markets  gies used  by grower-shippers  trying  to gain  com-
now  served  by producers  in  the  Southern  Hemi-  petitive  advantages  through  diversification.  Firm
sphere. Historically, Chile's primary markets  have  interest  in  extending  traditional  growing  seasons
been the United States and Europe and,  to a lesser  requires access to production factors (that is,  land,
extent,  Japan.  Geographic  diversification  offers  labor) located  in  microclimates  of an  agricultural
year-round  access  to  global  markets  with  allow-  region.  The  example  of  tomato  producers  now
ances  for  both  Northern  and  Southern  Hemi-  growing  in  various  sites  across  southern  Califor-
spheric production capabilities.  nia shows how geographic  diversification  strategy
Benefits from geographic  diversification  may  is manifesting itself within a single state. Accessi-
come  from being the  first to implement  diversifi-  bility to land  alone generates  new linkages  within
cation  strategy.  First-mover  advantages  often  cre-  the industry as ownership, leasing, and contracting
ate  strengthened  long-run  market  positions  by  options confront the grower-shipper.
firms.  For example,  Dole Food Company,  Inc.,  is  Not  all  firms  choose  to  extend  their  season
seeking  to  capture  such  benefits  by  immersing  through  geographic  diversification.  Instead, some
itself in production,  marketing,  and transportation  look  to differentiate their produce  in the hopes  of
operations  of fresh Chilean  fruits. Among the ad-  carving  a niche in the industry. The objective is to
vantages of early  market entry are claims on pre-  cater  to  a  specialty  market  where  the  shipper-
mier  factor inputs,  namely  managerial  talent,  la-  grower  receives  high  enough  prices  for their dif-
borers,  and  land.  An  important  note  is  that  first-  ferentiated  product,  over  an  abbreviated  time pe-
mover  advantages  are  presumably  temporary.  riod, such that it offsets the seasonal constraint.
Market power achieved  from first-mover  gains  is  Traditionally,  producers  have  harvested
likely to erode once other firms follow the lead.  where  marginal  revenue  equals  marginal  cost,
The  combination  of  lower  production  costs  meaning zero profits  (Sexton, Kling, and Carman,
and improved  economies  of scale  are  attractive ar-  1991).  Continuous,  year-round  production  capa-
guments  for  geographic  diversification  as  well.  bilities  imply an  opportunity for producers to  har-
Naturally  favorable geographic  conditions in Chile  vest beyond negative  price-cost differentials,  with
favor  geographic  diversification  for  agribusiness.  the intention of gaining back current losses later in
Natural barriers  (Pacific  Ocean,  Andes Mountains,  the  year.  Geographic  diversification  offers  new
Atacama  Desert)  contribute  to produce  production  risk management  options that were previously  not
typically free of pests and disease (California Table  available to the produce grower-shipper.
Grape Commission,  1998).  Subsequently,  costs for  On the  whole, geographic  diversification  has
chemical treatments to deter infectious  diseases and  worked  well  within  the  United  States  for  some
pests are significantly reduced.  firms  (Thompson  and  Wilson,  1997).  The  ques-
In response, increased sales volume, resulting  tion remains whether  a firm will find it profitable
from extended  growing seasons, could  also imply  to  geographically  diversify  on  a  global  scale.  To
heightened  market  competition  for  price  premi-  answer this we  look at the  price  dynamics  of the
urns  at the start and close of harvest  seasons. Con-  California-Chile  table grape market.
sumer  approval  from  longer  supply  periods  may
come  at  the  expense  of tougher  competition  for  Market Integration
producers.
Arguments against geographic  diversification  Market  integration  examines  the  degree  to
also  include the  increased  complexity  in  interna-  which  market  prices  will  equalize  across  loca-
tional  financing  efforts  (Thompson  and  Wilson,  tions. Market integration is significant to a firm, in
1997).  Firms  that  are  unfamiliar  with  foreign  in-  part because  it explores how  much market  power
stitutional  constraints  typically  face  increased  a firm could exert  without  having  their price bid
"organizational  requirements."  Such  requirements  down by  other  suppliers.  Highly  integrated  mar-
may  include  costs  associated  with  compliance  kets  imply  that the  law of one price holds. If two
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determination  in one market is not greatly affected  kets.2 This approach allows for varying degrees of
by supplies in other markets.  integration  over  time  due  to  exogenous  time-
Factors  affecting  market  integration  include  period,  specific  supply-demand  terms  (in  each
geographic  proximity  of  suppliers  to  market,  country),  and  changing  transportation  costs.  The
transaction  cost variables  (that is,  trade  barriers),  magnitude of the probability  of market integration
and  volume  supplied  to  the  market  (Spiller  and  will reflect time/season,  autarkic  prices,  and  ship-
Huang,  1986). Where producers  are close  to mar-  ping costs, endogenous to this model.
ket  and transaction  costs  is  low;  there is  a higher  Equations (3) and (4) define market prices in
probability  that the market  is  integrated.  If trans-  two locations,  where ic' represents constant means
action costs  are high, firms will not find  it profit-  and et' represents random shocks to the market.
able to sell in particular markets  because the costs
to supply the commodity  are greater than potential  (3)  PlA = 7r  +  Et.
revenue  from  sales.  Non-integrated  markets  can
result  from  prohibitive  transaction  costs  that  ex-  (4)  2A  =  r2  E
ceed price.
A test for market  integration is applied to the  Firms will find profitable trade opportunities across
California-Chile  table  grape  market. Results  from  markets, and prices will tend to equalize where
this  test  will  reflect  the  likelihood  of  prices
equalizing  during  periods  of overlapping  supply.  (5)  ,2 - P1 = T > 0.
The  likelihood  of price  equalization will  affect  a
firm's  geographic  diversification  approach.  Mar-  Let T=transaction  cost. Transaction  costs  are also
ket integration is evaluated as a probability, noting  random.
the likelihood  that a supplier's  price will be influ-
enced by other sellers  in the  market  over a given  (6)  T, = T +v, ,  v,  - N(0,  2  ).
time period.
Traditionally,  short-run  market  integration  Prices  will not equalize  where
has been evaluated using the following regression:
(7)  2_P  =T+v+  u,.
(1) (1)  Pt  = Po + PI2 + P2T2 +  e,
The  random  variable,  v,,  associated  with transac-
where P,',  i = 1, 2  is the price in region i at time t  tion  cost  accounts  for  stochastic  shocks  to  the
for a homogenous  good;  Tt  is the transaction  cost  transaction cost component; it is assumed that v, is
at  time  t required  to  ship  a  unit of  the  good be-  normally distributed. Ov 2 is the variance associated
tween  the two  regions;  and  e,  is  a random  error  with  the  variable  v,. The  variable  u, is  a positive
term. The test for short-run integration is based on  error term measuring the propensity to trade.  It is
the following hypotheses:  assumed to be  distributed one-half normal,  with a
variance  of GU 2. We also assume  v, and  u, are un-
(2)  H  : p  ,  =  ,  =  2 = 1.  correlated.  The probability at time t of no integra-
tion between the two regions is represented  as
The Model 
(8)  = prob  ,P
2 -PA <T+  v,}
A more recent approach is to consider short-run  = prob  {(7rl-  2 ) +(£l - E2)-  v,<  T}
market  integration  in  a probabilistic  framework.  In-
tegration is not an "all or nothing" result, but degrees  In this analysis, k represents the probability
of integration  can be estimated.  We use a variation  that the  market  is  not  ,  implying  that
of the Sexton,  Kling,  and  Carman  (1991)  model to  the  market  is  not  defined  by  a  common  geo-
investigate  the degree  of integration  of markets  for  graphical  boundary  and  supplies  in  one  market
imported  Chilean  grapes  and  California-produced  have little effect  on prices  in  another  market.  It
grapes. Sexton, Kling, and Carman tailor a switching
regression  model  and  maximum likelihood  estima-
tion  procedures  to fit agricultural commodities mar-  Sexton, Kling, and Carman's model adapts Spiller
and Huang's (1986) model to agricultural commodities.118  March 1999  Journal  of Food  Distribution  Research
is  the  likelihood  that  transaction  costs  exceed  A total of 41 daily price observations were used
price  differences.  A  X value  that  approaches  1  in the California-Chile  (Philadelphia) market (Table
(0) denotes regions that are almost continuously  4). Test results for the Califoria-Chile/Philadelphia
(never)  integrated.  Conversely,  I  - k  is  the  table  grape  market  in  December  are  presented  in
probability  of an  integrated  market.  Fully  inte-  Table 5.
grated  global  markets  would  exhibit  price  In  the  California-Chile  (Philadelphia)  De-
equalization  of  imports  and  domestically  pro-  cember market, there is  an  81  percent chance  that
duced grapes.  other producers'  supplies  do not affect  U.S.  mar-
Market integration is tested using a switching  ket price.  Conversely,  there is a  19  percent prob-
regression  model.  Parameters  are  estimated  using  ability that Chilean supplies influence  U.S.  prices.
maximum  likelihood  methods  in  the Time  Series  For  the  producer,  this  implies  that,  even  during
Program (TSP).  months of overlapping  supply, geographic diversi-
We examine the degree  of market integration  fication  could  be  undertaken  without  complete
in  the California-Chile  table  grape  market.  Fruit  loss of U.S. market premiums.
& Vegetable Market News (USDA) provided daily
price  data  for  the  years  1993  through  1997.  All  International Trade Policy
prices  reflect  wholesale  terminal  market  prices. 
We  assume  homogeneity  of table  grape varieties  International  geographic  diversification  re-
for empirical  analysis.  quires  that  agribusinesses  confront  trade-specific
risk  factors,  such  as  trade  policy.  Trade  policy
Market Integration Test Results  affects  the  market's  inclination  toward  price
equalization  based on buyers'  and  sellers'  behav-
Chilean  table  grapes  enter the  United  States  ior alone. To this end, U.S.  table grape producers
in  greatest  quantities  through  the  ports  of Phila-  reference  trade  policy  as  it  influences  quantities
delphia,  Pennsylvania,  and  Los Angeles,  Califor-  demanded and supplied.
nia.  Due to  the  geographic  distance  between  the  Market  fluctuations  that  stem  from  changes
two ports  of entry, each port is treated  as a market  in trade policy  signal producers  to adjust produc-
and  is  tested  for  degree  of  integration  with  the  tion  strategies.  A  firm's  response  to  a  potential
California  market.  Tests  for  market  integration  free trade policy is a function of its ability to con-
were  conducted  for May  and  December  because  tinually  access  markets  and  to  stay  competitive
these two  months  are periods of overlapping  sup-  within the industry. The effect of changes to com-
ply. During December,  Chile is the primary  com-  ponents  of transaction  costs,  namely  tariff  rates,
petitor of California producers  in the U.S. market.  on  a firm's  ability  to  access  a  market  and  influ-
During May, Mexico  is the primary competitor  of  ence  international  geographic diversification  strat-
California producers  in the U.S. market.  egy  will be illustrated in this section. When tariff
The California-Chile  (Los Angeles) market is  rates  cause  transaction  costs  to  escalate,  they  ef-
evaluated first.  A total of  19  daily  price observa-  fectivel  reduce  the  roducer's  strenth  in  the
tions  were  used.  Descnptive  statistics  are  shown  market
in  Table  2.  Test  results  for  the  California-Chile (ST  Angeble  s  . mrest  ar.eut  so  in Talefoi3.hUnrestricted  trade  is defined as an  absence  of (Los  Angeles) market are shown in Table 3. eos  Angeles) market are shown ie Table  i3.  import taxes or other nontariff barriers that impede The  results  for  the  parameter  3  are  inter-
et  asu prc  the  marke  i  re  perfect  competition  in a market. Implementation  of preted as  a 91  percent chance that the markets are a zero-rate  tariff would  shift  transaction  cost  em- not  integrated.  The  X  value represents  the chance  p  phasis to shipping and handling fees completely.  If that Californian  and  Chilean  prices  are independ-  Chile  and  the  United  States  enter  a  free  trade
ent of one  another  in  this time  period. The prob-  ,  ii  i agreement,  only  shipping  and  handling  charges ability that Chilean supplies affect the direction of  remain  seently  maet inte  n  od 
at^~~  ,./.  . ^~.  .remain.  Subsequently, market  integration  would be Californian  pnrice  movements  in December  is  1 - Californian  price  movements  in  December  is  I  - expected  to be greater,  and firms'  profits  would be
, or 9 percent.  For the  producer, this means  that  influenced by the price equalization  effects.
geographic  diversification  will  not  completely  The  U.S.  Harmonized  Tariff  Schedule  pro-
erode domestic  price.  vides  existing  tariff  rates  for  imported  table
—~~~~~~~~3  ~~grapes.  Chile  is  recognized  as  a  Most  Favored
3This implies that Chilean prices are transaction  cost-  Nation (MFN) that entitles  exporters to the United
inclusive.Krueger,  A.,  V. Salin, et al.  Profitability  of Geographic Diversification  Strategy  119
Table 2. Price Statistics for California-Chile (Los Angeles)  Table Grapes, December 1993-97.
Mean  Std. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum
- US$/ lb. - - US$/ lb. - - US$/  lb. -
California  0.45998  0.07016  0.30947  0.61246
Chile (Los Angeles)  1.46170  0.25697  0.96278  2.09722
Price Difference  1.00171  0.24504  0.56303  1.56568
Table 3. Parameter Estimates for California-Chile (Los Angeles)  Market, December 1993-97.a
Parameter  Estimate  Std. Error  T-Statistic
av 2 0.046362  0.021986  2.10867
T  0.195233  0.106531  1.83263
ut  0.118548  0.091963  1.28908
,,  0.914006  0.156050  5.85714
a Convergence  of maximum likelihood estimates occurred after  14 iterations.
Table 4. Price Statistics for California-Chile (Philadelphia) Table Grapes, December 1993-97.
Mean  Std.  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum
-US$/ lb. - - US$/ lb. - - US$/ lb. -
California  0.45998  0.07016  0.30947  0.61246
Chile (Philadelphia)  1.46170  0.25697  0.96278  2.09722
Price Difference  1.00171  0.24504  0.56303  1.56568
Table 5. Parameter Estimates for California-Chile (Philadelphia) Market, December 1993-97.a
Parameter  Estimate  Std. Error  T-Statistic
cYv 2 0.045775  0.015459  2.96107
T  0.116000  0.037525  3.09132
ut  0.042945  0.022178  1.93637
i  0.813626  0.129685  6.27387
a Convergence  of maximum likelihood estimates occurred  after 13 iterations.
States to reduced  tariff rates. The MFN tariff rate  model to illustrate  gains from a reduction in tariff
for  grapes  entering  between  15  February  and  1  levels,  as  would  occur  if NAFTA  is  extended  to
March,  inclusive,  in  any  year  is  $1.22  per cubic  South America.  It is assumed  that there is perfect
meter.  If table  grapes  enter the  U.S.  market  be-  factor  mobility,  constant  costs  of production,  no
tween  01  April  and  30  June,  inclusive,  in  any  technological  change  or transportation  costs,  and
year,  they  enter  free  of duty.  Table  grapes  im-  perfectly  competitive  markets. These  assumptions
ported at any other time of the year are  subject to  are  applied  to  analysis  during  the  month  of  De-
a  $1.91  per cubic meter tax. Chilean  table  grapes  cember,  indicating the  close  of  the  U.S.  produc-
do not receive Generalized  System of Preferences  tion  season  and  overlapping  supply  from  Chile.
(GSP)  status  since  the  quantity  imported  exceeds  Moreover,  U.S. tariff rates are highest at this time.
the amount allotted Chile.  The United  States and  Chile  are considered  large
A  partial  equilibrium  trade  analysis  pro-  trading  countries.  Other  large  grape-producing
vides anticipated results from implementation of a  nations  affect  the  United  States  and  Chile  only
free trade regime. The analysis will  indicate econ-  peripherally  since  trade  volume  is  insignificant
omy-wide benefits  of tariff reduction.  We assume  between  the  United  States  and  Chile  and  the  re-
four  conditions  in  using  a  partial  equilibrium  maining grape-producing nations.120  March 1999  Journal  of Food Distribution  Research
The  levels  of trade  by  market  participants,  cent  of the  market.  Forecasts  will  take trend  and
under the current  U.S.  duty  rate,  are illustrated  in  seasonality characteristics  into account.
Figure 4.  The  quantity  demanded  in  Chile  is de-  The  model  uses  monthly  price  and  quantity
noted O-A,  and the quantity  supplied is denoted 0-  data  for  Chilean  and  Californian  producers.
B. The  quantity  demanded  in the United States  is  Monthly  analysis  is  preferred  given  the  highly
represented  by  O-Z,  and  the  quantity  supplied  is  seasonal  nature of the commodity.  A total  of  156
represented  by  O-W.  With the existing tariff rate,  price and quantity observations  are evaluated from
the  distance  O-Qw  represents  world  trade.  The  1985-1997  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture  and
amount of the tariff revenue  is represented  by the  California Table Grape Commission data.
rectangle  mnpq.  Revenues  generated  from  tariff  To estimate  1998  price distribution,  Califor-
collection accrue to the U.S. government.  nian  and  Chilean  quantity  supplied  forecasts  are
In  a  free  trade  environment,  quantity  de-  necessary.  They  are  evaluated  as  a  function  of
manded  by  Chile  equals  O-C,  and  quantity  sup-  year and month variables to capture trend and sea-
plied equals  O-D. The U.S.  market  shows  domes-  sonality  components.  Californian  and  Chilean
tic  quantity  demanded  represented  by  O-X  and  quantity  supplied distributions  are estimated  on  a
quantity supplied represented by  O-Y.  World trade  monthly  basis.  We  identify  price  volatility  as  a
volume is O-Qw'.  function  of  stochastic  monthly  supply  volumes
Changes  about quantities demanded  and sup-  and  a  random  error  component,  assumed  to  be
plied  and  about  price levels  in  each  of the three  distributed N(0,(2).
markets  are revealed in the model.  In the Chilean  To  capture the variability  in  monthly prices
market,  quantity  demanded  decreases  under  free  associated  with variability  in production  in each
trade  as  a result  of a  price  increase,  and  quantity  country,  residuals  from  the  quantity  equations
supplied  increases  due  to  producers'  interest  in  are  grouped by  month across the  13-year period.
selling greater  amounts  at the higher price. In the  The  mean  and  standard  deviation  for the appro-
United  States,  the  market  price  falls  under  free  priate  months'  residuals  are used to simulate the
trade, leading to an  increase in quantity  demanded  variability  in production of grapes in each  coun-
by consumers  and a reduction  in quantity  supplied  try  in  each  month.  These  stochastic  values  are
by  producers.  In  the  international  market,  world  used, along with a random error term, to estimate
trade volume increases from O-Q,  to O-Q,'.  the  price  distribution  for  grapes  in  the  United
Partial  equilibrium  analysis  indicates  that  States.
moving from  a specific  tax to free  trade will lead  Finally,  three  diversification  scenarios  are
to an increase  in three  areas:  world trade  volume,  simulated  from  the  above  cross-sectional  time-
U.S. imports, and Chilean exports.  Quantitatively,  series analysis.  Scenarios  1 and  3  calculate total
the magnitude of the effects  of a free trade agree-  revenue,  assuming  a  U.S.  producer  produces
ment will depend  on the  elasticities  of the supply  their total  annual  volume  supplied  to market  in
and demand curves of markets.  either California  or  Chile  solely.  Scenario  2  al-
lows for diversification  and calculates  total  reve-
Profitability of International Profitability of International  nue if the firm's  volume  is  halved  and  produced
Geographic Diversification  in both countries.
The  final  phase  of  this  study  examines  the  Using  Monte  Carlo  simulation  techniques,
effects  of  geographic  diversification  on  a  pro-  three alternative diversification plans are run with
ducer's profit  margin. Alternative  production  sce-  500  iterations  each.  Summary  statistics  for  each
narios  confronting  a  hypothetical  U.S.  producer  plan are provided in
are  simulated  from  stochastic  price  and  quantity  Table 6.
distributions.  Figure  5  graphically  illustrates  the  three cu-
mulative  distribution  functions  associated  with
The Model  each  production  plan.  Stochastic  dominance  the-
ory would  suggest that the geographic diversifica-
The proposed model is a firm-level, one year-  tion  strategy  dominates  the  single  location  strate-
ahead  forecast  of potential  annual  revenue  for  a  gies  despite having a slightly higher variance than
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Table 6. Projected 1998 Revenue  from Diversification  Plans.
Scenario  Mean  Std. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum
-US$-  -US$-  -US$  -
California Only  52844.91  6628.305  26767.49  72061.26
California & Chile  76312.48  8410.033  42196.39  99530.63
Chile Only  66147.28  10838.39  37536.62  98656.95
Figure 5. Revenue Distributions for Production Plans.
(US$  in thousands)
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Preliminary  results  suggest  that U.S.  producers  tic  prices  received  by  U.S.  table grape  producers
could  profit  from  implementing  a  diversification  during periods of overlapping  supply.
strategy. It should be noted, however, that cost-related  The  leading benefit to  firms that  geographi-
measures  have not been accounted for; once they are,  cally diversify  is the potential  for year-round  pro-
results  may  change.  In  addition, the reported  results  duction. The tradeoff is that early-season and late-
are from initial simulation trials that assume  zero-rate  season domestic price premiums might  be eroded
tariffs  and perfectly integrated  markets,  or  complete  if  markets  are  integrated.  If  many  firms  geo-
price  convergence.  The  next  step  will  incorporate  graphically diversify, an increase in market supply
tariff rates and  market integration  into the model  to  levels could generate lower prices.
more  closely  resemble  real  time  conditions  in  the  Tests for market integration in the California-
event that the North American Free Trade Agreement  Chile  (Los Angeles)  market  indicate  that U.S.  ta-
is extended to the Southern Hemisphere.  ble  grape  producers  face  a  9  percent  probability
that their price will be bid down by low-cost Chil-
Conclusions  ean  imports.  With  respect  to the  California-Chile
(Philadelphia)  market, there is a 19 percent chance
This paper evaluated relevant factors facing a  that  U.S.  producers'  prices  will  be  affected  by
U.S.  table  grape producer considering  geographi-  Chilean imports. These results  indicate that, while
cal  diversification  in  the  Southern  Hemisphere.  U.S.  prices  are  likely  to be  influenced  by  com-
Market  integration  and  free  trade  policy  are  petitors  in the  market,  seasonal  premiums  should
examined in terms of their likely effect on domes-  not be significantly  eroded.Krueger, A.,  V.  Salin, et al.  Profitability  of Geographic  Diversification  Strategy  123
Implementing  free trade will reduce  transac-  sibly  achieve  greater  total  annual  revenue  against
tion costs to shipping  and handling  fees.  Without  those  firms producing solely  in one country.  It ap-
U.S.  import taxes,  producers  in  Chile should  find  pears  that geographic diversification could be profit-
it  less  expensive  to  access  U.S.  markets.  Ease  of  able  although further  research  should be undertaken
accessibility  to  U.S.  markets  could  lead  to  in-  to  account for cost-related  factors  in diversification
creased  degrees  of market  integration.  A  partial  modeling as they influence firm revenue.
equilibrium  model  suggests  that  free  trade  will
lead to  higher Chilean prices but  is countered  by  References
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